

Dynamics and learning in online allocation problems

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
- 1 Motivation/introduction
- 2 Online matching with budget refills
- 3 Online matching on stochastic block model
- 4 Conclusion and future works



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Motivation: online advertisement


Constraint 1: online arrivals



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Motivation: online advertisement

Constraint 2: budget evolution




Budget evolution of an ad:



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Motivation: online advertisement

Constraint 3: community structure



Key elements of our setting

- ▶ **Online user arrivals:** decisions made sequentially.
- ▶ **Ad budgets:** limited and sometimes refilled.
- ▶ **Communities:** matching users to relevant ads.

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Warm-up: standard online matching

Modeling:

- ▶ Natural structure: **bipartite graphs**.
- ▶ Online arrivals: **part of the graph is unknown**.

For $t = 1, \dots, |V|$:

- ▶ v_t arrives with its edges.
- ▶ Each node $u \in U$ has a budget $b_u \in \{0, 1\}$ (degree of u).
- ▶ The algorithm can match v_t to a neighbor in U .
- ▶ The matching decision is **irrevocable**.






Figure: Online matching on a bipartite graph.

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The performance of an algorithm

Figure: $ALG = 2$.Figure: $OPT = 3$.

Definition (informal)

For $G \in \mathcal{G}$, where \mathcal{G} is a family of graphs, the competitive ratio is defined as:

$$CR = \frac{\mathbb{E}(ALG(G))}{\mathbb{E}(OPT(G))}.$$

Note that $0 \leq CR \leq 1$.

- ▶ **Adversarial (Adv)**: G can be any graph. The vertices of V arrive in any order.
- ▶ **Stochastic (IID)**: The vertices of V are drawn iid from a distribution.

Frameworks depend on the type of the graph!

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Greedy Algorithm

Algorithm 1:

Input: a bipartite graph G **Output:** a matching M **for** $t = 1, \dots, |V|$ **do** Match v_t to any free neighbor
 chosen uniformly at random. Update M .**end**


Theorem:(informal)Adversarial setting ([Mehta](#) et al. 2013),

$$CR(\text{Greedy}) = \frac{1}{2}.$$

Stochastic setting ([Mastin](#) et al. 2013),

$$CR(\text{Greedy}) \geq 0.837.$$

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Online b -matching problem: Balance algorithm**Algorithm 2:****Input:** a bipartite graph G **Output:** a matching M **for** $t = 1, \dots, |V|$ **do** Match v_t to a neighbor with
 highest remaining budget. Update M .**end****Theorem: (informal)**

In the adversarial framework:

If $b_u = b$ (Kalyanasundaram et al. 2000),

$$CR(\text{Balance}) = 1 - \frac{1}{(1 + 1/b)^b}.$$

With different budgets (Albers et al. 2021),

$$CR(\text{Balance}) = 1 - \frac{1}{(1 + 1/b_{\min})^{b_{\min}}}.$$

$$b_{\min} = \min_{u \in U} b_u.$$

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Differential equation method - the goal

In stochastic frameworks, **how does the matching process evolve over time?**

- ▶ Does it move smoothly toward equilibrium?
- ▶ Or does it fluctuate unpredictably due to randomness?

For $i = 0, 1, 2, \dots$, we have a discrete time random process


$$Y(i) = (Y_1(i), \dots, Y_a(i)),$$

(e.g. numbers of edges, degrees, components in a random graph process).

❓ Understand the *typical trajectory* of Y as the system grows.



💡 Rely on ordinary differential equations.



Key idea \rightarrow think of $\mathbb{E}[Y_k(i+1) - Y_k(i) \mid \mathcal{F}_i]$ as a gradient.

Assumptions

▶ **Approximate the drift.**

$\mathbb{E}[Y_k(i+1) - Y_k(i) \mid \mathcal{F}_i] = F_k(i/n, Y_1/n, \dots, Y_a/n) + o(1)$, with F “nice enough”.

▶ **Check** $|Y_k(i+1) - Y_k(i)|$ is small enough.

nice enough = sufficiently smooth.

\rightarrow Then, with high probability, the random process $\frac{Y_k(i)}{n}$ stays very close to $y_k(t)$ the solution of $y_k'(t) = F_k(t, y_1(t), \dots, y_a(t))$.


\rightarrow Dynamic concentration of the process around its expected trajectory.

This result is known as the Wormald theorem ([Wormald 1999](#); [Warnke 2019](#)).

- ⚠ In practice, the bottleneck is solving the ODE.
- ▶ The drift $F(\cdot)$ is often **non-linear and high-dimensional**.
 - ▶ No closed-form solution in many real problems.
 - ▶ Even numerically, the behavior may be tricky to understand.

Our strategy:

- ▶ **Study the stationary solution** (equilibrium).
- ▶ **Construct good approximations** of the ODE trajectory.
- ▶ **Solve the ODE** in closed form.



More realistic setting:
online matching with budget refills (**Cherifa** et al.
2024)



Clément Calauzènes



Vianney Perchet

Constraint 1 + Constraint 2: online arrivals and budget evolution.

The standard online matching

- ▶ $G = (U, V, E)$ is a bipartite graph.
- ▶ Nodes in U are offline and nodes in V are online.
- ▶ Each node in U has a budget $b_{u,t} \in \{0, 1\}$,

$$b_{u,t} = \begin{cases} b_{u,t-1} - 1 & \text{match,} \\ b_{u,t-1} & \text{no match.} \end{cases}$$

Budget refills

- ▶ $G = (U, V, E)$ is a bipartite graph.
- ▶ Nodes in U are offline and nodes in V are online.
- ▶ Each node in U has a budget $b_{u,t} \in \mathbb{N}$,

$$b_{u,t} = \begin{cases} b_{u,t-1} - 1 + r_t & \text{match,} \\ b_{u,t-1} + r_t & \text{no match.} \end{cases}$$

r_t can be stochastic or deterministic.

Let $G=(U,V,E)$ be a bipartite graph.

- ▶ $|U| = n, |V| = T$ with $T \geq n$.
- ▶ Nodes in U are offline and nodes in V are online.
- ▶ Each node in U has a budget $b_{u,t} \geq 0$ at time $t \in [T]$.

A matching on G is a binary matrix

$\mathbf{x} \in \{0, 1\}^{n \times T}$ such that,

- ▶ $\forall (u, t) \in U \times V, (u, t) \notin E \Rightarrow x_{u,t} = 0$.
- ▶ $\forall t \in V, \sum_{u \in U} x_{u,t} \leq 1$.
- ▶ $\forall (u, t) \in U \times V, b_{u,t-1} < 1 \Rightarrow x_{u,t} = 0$.

Two frameworks considered:

- ▶ Stochastic framework.
- ▶ Adversarial framework.

G is an Erdős - Rényi sparse random graph:

- ▶ Edges occurring independently with probability $p = a/n$.
- ▶ Each node in U has a budget $b_{u,t} \in \mathbb{N}$. Budget dynamics:

$$b_{u,t} = \min(K, b_{u,t-1} - x_{u,t} + r_t), \quad b_{u,0} = b_0,$$

r_t is a realization of a Bernoulli random variable $\mathcal{B}(\frac{\beta}{n})$.

Budgets are capped by K .

- ▶ **Greedy in standard online matching:** the matching size built by Greedy satisfies,

$$\mathbb{E} [\text{Greedy}(G, t) - \text{Greedy}(G, t - 1) | \text{Greedy}(G, t)] = 1 - \left(1 - \frac{a}{n}\right)^{n - \text{Greedy}(G, t)}.$$

- ▶ $\text{Greedy}(G, t)/n \xrightarrow{\text{w.h.p.}} z$, where z is the solution of $\dot{z}(t) = 1 - e^{-a(1-z(t))}$.

- ▶ **Greedy in online matching matching with budget refill:** match only if budget ≥ 1 , thus,

$$\mathbb{E} [\text{Greedy}(G, t + 1) - \text{Greedy}(G, t) | \text{Greedy}(G, t)] = 1 - \left(1 - \frac{a}{n}\right)^{n - Y_0(t)}.$$

$\text{Greedy}(G, t)$ depends on Y_k , the number of nodes in U with budget k .

- ▶ **K dimensional problem!**

Theorem: (Cherifa et al. 2024) (informal)

For $\frac{T}{n} \geq 1$, with high probability Greedy(G, T) is given by,

$$\text{Greedy}(G, T) = nh(T/n) + o(n).$$

Where h is solution of: $\dot{h}(\tau) = 1 - e^{-a(1-z_0(\tau))}$, and z_0 is the solution of,

$$\begin{cases} \dot{z}_0(\tau) = -z_0(\tau)\beta + z_1(\tau)g(z_0(\tau)) & \text{for } k = 0, \\ \dot{z}_k(\tau) = -\Delta z_k(\tau)\beta + \Delta z_{k+1}(\tau)g(z_0(\tau)) & \text{for } 1 \leq k \leq K-1, \\ \dot{z}_k(\tau) = \beta z_{k-1}(\tau) - z_k(\tau)g(z_0(\tau)) & \text{for } k = K, \\ \sum_{k=0}^K z_k(\tau) = 1. \end{cases} \quad (1)$$

$$g(z_0(\tau)) = \frac{1 - e^{-a + az_0(\tau)}}{1 - z_0(\tau)}, \Delta z_k(\tau) = z_k(\tau) - z_{k-1}(\tau) \text{ and } 0 \leq \tau \leq T/n.$$

$$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \dot{h} = 1 - e^{-a(1-z_0)} \\ \dot{z}_0 = -z_0 \beta + z_1 \frac{1 - e^{-a+az_0}}{1 - z_0} \\ \dot{z}_k = (z_{k-1} - z_k)\beta + (z_{k+1} - z_k) \frac{1 - e^{-a+az_0}}{1 - z_0} \\ \dot{z}_K = \beta z_{K-1} - z_K \frac{1 - e^{-a+az_0}}{1 - z_0} \\ \sum_{k=0}^K z_k = 1 \end{array} \right.$$

⚠ Hard to solve

- ▶ Non-linear and strongly coupled in (z_0, \dots, z_K) .
- ▶ No closed-form even for small K .

💡 Our strategy

- ▶ Focus on the **stationary solution** (z_0^*, \dots, z_K^*) : analyze its stability and derive performance guarantees.

For $K = 1$, eq. (1) is reduced to

$$\begin{cases} \dot{z}_0(\tau) = -\beta z_0(\tau) + z_1(\tau)g(z_0(\tau)) \\ \dot{z}_1(\tau) = \beta z_0(\tau) - z_1(\tau)g(z_0(\tau)) \\ z_0(\tau) + z_1(\tau) = 1 \end{cases}$$

The stationary solution (z_0^*, z_1^*) is **exponentially stable**,

$$z_0^* = \frac{1}{\beta} - \frac{1}{a} W\left(\frac{a}{\beta} e^{-a(1-\frac{1}{\beta})}\right),$$

$$z_1^* = z_0^* \frac{\beta}{g(z_0^*)}.$$

W is the Lambert function.

Corollary: (Cherifa et al. 2024)
(informal)

For $\frac{T}{n} \geq 1$, with high probability,

$$|\text{Greedy}(\mathbf{G}, T) - nh^*(T/n)| \leq CT^{1-\epsilon},$$

with,

$$h^*(x) = x(1 - e^{-a(1-z_0^*)}).$$

Here $\epsilon > 0$ and C are known constants.

The stationary solution of eq. (1) is **asymptotically stable** and is given by,

$$\left(z_0^*, z_0^* \frac{\beta}{g(z_0^*)}, \dots, z_0^* \left(\frac{\beta}{g(z_0^*)} \right)^K \right),$$

z_0^* is the unique solution of

$$\sum_{k=0}^K z_0^* \left(\frac{\beta}{g(z_0^*)} \right)^k = 1.$$

Corollary: (Cherifa et al. 2024)
(informal)

For $\frac{T}{n} \geq 1$, with high probability,

$$|\text{Greedy}(\mathbf{G}, T) - nh^*(T/n)| \leq o(T),$$

with $h^*(x) = x(1 - e^{-a(1-z_0^*)})$.

✓ Simple case: $K = 1$

- ▶ Only **two** budget levels: $\{0, 1\}$.
- ▶ Constraint $z_0 + z_1 = 1 \Rightarrow$ **one-dimensional ODE**.
- ▶ Every deviation is immediately pulled back.

Exponential stability
(fast convergence)

✗ General case: $K > 1$

- ▶ **Multiple** budget levels: $0, 1, \dots, K$.
- ▶ Perturbations can **spread across levels**.
- ▶ In some directions perturbations decay **slowly**.

Only asymptotic stability
(slow convergence in some directions)

→ **Stability strongly depends on K**

Stability analysis of stationary solutions of an ODE system via the eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix at the equilibrium point.

$$J = \begin{pmatrix} -\beta + z_1^* g'(z_0^*) & g(z_0^*) & 0 & \cdots & 0 \\ \beta + (z_2^* - z_1^*) g'(z_0^*) & -\beta - g(z_0^*) & g(z_0^*) & \ddots & \vdots \\ (z_3^* - z_2^*) g'(z_0^*) & \beta & -\beta - g(z_0^*) & \ddots & 0 \\ \vdots & \ddots & \ddots & \ddots & g(z_0^*) \\ -z_K^* g'(z_0^*) & \cdots & 0 & \beta & -g(z_0^*) \end{pmatrix}.$$

The spectrum of J lies in the left half-plane, apart from one eigenvalue located at zero.

Theorem: (Cherifa et al. 2024) (informal)

$$CR(\text{Greedy}) \geq 1 - \frac{\beta T z_0^* \left(\frac{\beta}{g(z_0^*)}\right)^K + n z_0^* \sum_{k=1}^K k \left(\frac{\beta}{g(z_0^*)}\right)^k}{n b_0 + \beta T} + O(T^{-1/4}),$$

When T, n, K tends to $+\infty$:

$$|CR(\text{Greedy}) - 1| \rightarrow 0,$$

where z_0^* and g defined as previously.

Interpretation:

- ▶ When $T \rightarrow \infty$: $CR(\text{Greedy}) \rightarrow \frac{g(z_0^*)(1-z_0^*)}{\beta}$ (the CR depends only on the stationary point).
- ▶ When $K, n \rightarrow \infty$: $\frac{g(z_0^*)(1-z_0^*)}{\beta} \rightarrow 1$ (Greedy wastes almost nothing when budgets grow).

$G = (U, V, E)$ is a bipartite graph generated by an oblivious adversary:

- ▶ $|U| = n$ and $|V| = T$ with $T \geq n$.
- ▶ Each node in U has a budget $b_{u,t} \in \mathbb{N}$. Budget dynamics:

$$b_{u,t} = b_{u,t-1} - x_{u,t} + \mathbb{1}_{t \bmod m=0}, \quad b_{u,0} = b_0.$$

💡 m is the parameter of the frequency of the refills.

Theorem: (Cherifa et al. 2024)
(informal)

For $m \geq \sqrt{T}$,

$$CR(\text{Balance}) \leq 1 - \frac{1}{\left(1 + \frac{1}{b_0}\right)^{b_0}}.$$

Theorem: (Cherifa et al. 2024)(informal)

For $m = o(\sqrt{T})$,

$$CR(\text{Balance}) \leq 1 - \underbrace{\frac{(1-\alpha)}{e^{(1-\alpha)}}}_{\simeq 0.73325\dots}.$$

where α is defined by $\frac{1}{2} = \int_0^\alpha \frac{xe^x}{1-x} dx$.



No deterministic algorithm can beat Balance.

More realistic setting:
online matching on stochastic block model (**Cherifa**
et al. 2025)



Clément Calauzènes



Vianney Perchet

Constraint 1 + Constraint 3: online arrivals and community structure.

Erdős - Rényi model

- ▶ All ads are statistically identical.
- ▶ Every user connects to every ads with same probability p .
- ▶ Matching decisions depend only on availability (budget 0 or 1).
- ▶ **✗** no community structure.

Stochastic block model

- ▶ Users and ads are divided into communities.
- ▶ Edge probability depends on class pair $p_{c,d}$.
- ▶ Each class evolves differently and affects the others.

Matching depends on class proportions and compatibility matrix.


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Problem setting

Let G be a bipartite graph
 $G = (U, V, E)$.

- ▶ $|U| = n$ offline nodes,
 $|V| = T \geq n$ online arrivals.
- ▶ Offline and online nodes have classes in \mathcal{C} and \mathcal{D} .
- ▶ Each $u \in U$ and $v \in V$ has a class $c(u) \sim \mu$ and $d(v) \sim \nu$.
- ▶ Conditional on classes,

$$\Pr[(u, v) \in E] = p_{c(u), d(v)}.$$



💡 Generalization of Erdős - Rényi

- ▶ The sparse regime: every $p_{c,d} = \frac{a_{c,d}}{n}$.
- ▶ b_c is the proportion of nodes in class c .
- ▶ $M_c(t)$ is the number of matched nodes in class c .
- ▶ $M(t) := \sum_{c \in \mathcal{C}} M_c(t)$ is the size of the matching constructed.
- ▶ $\mathcal{F}_c(t)$ is the set of unmatched nodes of class c .

Two cases of study:

- ▶ The probabilities $p_{c,d}$ are **known**.
- ▶ The probabilities $p_{c,d}$ are **unknown**.

Goal. When a node of class d arrives, pick an offline class c that yields a good chance of matching **without exhausting capacities**.

Idea. Pre-compute an **optimal plan** Q^* such that:

$$Q^* \in \arg \max_Q \sum_{c,d} Q(c,d)p(c,d),$$

$$\text{s.t. } \sum_d Q(c,d)\nu(d) = b_c, \forall c \in \mathcal{C},$$

$$\text{and } \sum_c Q(c,d)\nu(d) = \nu(d), \forall d \in \mathcal{D}.$$

 **Intuition.** Q^* is a **smart allocation**: It sends each type- d arrival to the most promising offline classes while respecting capacities.

Algorithm 3: Myopic algorithm

Output: Updated matching $M(t)$

Compute the optimal Q^* .

for $t \in [T]$ **do**

 Choose $c_t \in \mathcal{C}$ at random with probability $Q^*(c_t, d_t)/\nu(d_t)$.

if $\mathcal{F}_{c_t}(t) = \emptyset$ **then**

$M(t) = M(t-1)$.

else

$M(t) = M(t-1) \cup \{(u_t, t)\}$ for $u_t \sim \text{unif}(\mathcal{F}_{c_t}(t))$.

▶ **Myopic in Erdős–Rényi (homogeneous case)**

- ▶ One global matching process $M(t)$.
- ▶ $\frac{M(t)}{n} \xrightarrow{\text{w.h.p.}} y(t), \quad \dot{y}(t) = 1 - e^{-a(1-y(t))}$.
- ▶ **Scalar ODE, explicit closed form for y .**

▶ **Myopic in SBM (structured, heterogeneous case)**

- ▶ One matching process *per class* c : $M_c(t)$.
- ▶ With high probability, for each class c : $\frac{M_c(t)}{n} \xrightarrow{\text{w.h.p.}} y_c(t)$, where y_c solves

$$\dot{y}_c(t) = \sum_{d=1}^D \left(1 - e^{-a_{c,d}(b_c - y_c(t))} \right) Q^*(c, d).$$
- ▶ **No closed form:** depends on the *class* c , all neighbor classes d , and the optimal plan Q^* .

Theorem: (Cherifa et al. 2025) (informal)

Let $T = \alpha n$, and $y_c : [0, \alpha] \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ be the solution of the following ODE,

$$\dot{y}_c(s) = \sum_{d=1}^D (1 - e^{-a_{c,d}(b_c - y_c(s))}) Q^*(c, d),$$

$$y_c(0) = 0.$$

Then, for each class $c \in \mathcal{C}$, $M_c(t)$ satisfies w.h.p,

$$|M_c(t)/n - y_c(t/n)| \leq \mathcal{O}_{L_c, \alpha}(n^{-1/3}).$$

Moreover, $y_c = \tilde{y}_c - e_c$, with $\tilde{y}_c(t) = b_c(1 - e^{-tL_c})$, and e_c satisfies,

$$e_c(t) \leq J_c(1 - e^{-L_c t})/L_c.$$

where, J_c and L_c are known constants.

Algorithm 4: Balance

Output: Updated matching $M(t)$ **for** $t \in [T]$ **do** Choose $c_t = \arg \max_{c \in [C]} \sum_{j=1}^D (1 - (1 - \frac{a_{c,j}}{n})^{nb_c - M_c(t)}) \nu(j)$ **if** $\mathcal{F}_{c_t}(t) = \emptyset$ **then** | $M(t) = M(t-1)$. **else** | $M(t) = M(t-1) \cup \{(u_t, t)\}$ for $u_t \sim \text{unif}(\mathcal{F}_{c_t}(t))$.

Greedy: smooth decisions

- ▶ Matching probability is a **continuous** function of the state.
- ▶ **ODE approximation works.**

Balance: switches to the class with **max availability**.

- ▶ Drift has an **indicator of the maximizer**:

$$\mathbb{E}[M_c(t+1) - M_c(t) \mid n, \mathbf{M}(t)] = H_{c,b_c,n}(M_c(t)) \cdot \underbrace{\mathbf{1}\left\{H_{c,b_c,n}(M_c(t)) = \max_{k \in [C]} H_{k,b_k,n}(M_k(t))\right\}}_{\text{discontinuous at ties}}$$

⊘ **Drift is not Lipschitz** \Rightarrow ODE method fails.

➔ A stronger tool is needed: Differential Inclusions.

$$H_{c,b_c,n}(x) = \sum_{d=1}^D (1 - (1 - a_{c,d}/n)^{nb_c - x}) \nu(d)$$

ODE: one direction at each point

$$\dot{x}(t) = f(x(t)).$$

Differential inclusion: many possible directions

$$\dot{x}(t) \in F(x(t)),$$

where $F(x)$ is a **set-valued map**.

It is needed here because:

- ▶ Balance **switches** between classes: drift is not continuous.
- ▶ DI **naturally handles switching** and multiple possible drifts.

❓ Does the matching process converge to a DI?

Setting (Markov chain with small drift and noise)

$$Y^N(k+1) = Y^N(k) + g^N(Y^N(k)) + U^N(k+1)$$

Assumptions

- ▶ **Vanishing drift:** $g^N = \gamma^N f^N$, with $\gamma^N \rightarrow 0$.
- ▶ **Small noise:** U^N is a martingale difference (no big jumps).

Key idea: If the drift is discontinuous, the limit is **set-valued**:

$$\dot{y}(t) \in F(y(t)).$$

➔ With high probability, Y^N stays **close** to a trajectory of $\dot{y}(t) \in F(y(t))$.

💡 **Even with discontinuities, the stochastic process has a deterministic limit.**

Our contribution. the matching process under Balance **converges to a deterministic differential inclusion.**

Theorem (informal) (Cherifa et al. 2025)

Let $T = \alpha n$, and let m be the unique solution of the differential inclusion

$$\dot{m}(t) \in F(m(t)) := \text{conv} \left\{ f_{c,b_c}(m_c(t)) e_c : c \in \arg \max_{k \in [C]} f_{k,b_k}(m_k(t)) \right\},$$

where $f_{c,b_c}(x) = \sum_{d=1}^D (1 - e^{-a_{c,d}(b_c - x)}) \nu(d)$. Then, for all $t \in [T]$ and $c \in \mathcal{C}$, with high probability,

$$\left| \frac{M_c(t)}{n} - m_c(t/n) \right| \leq \mathcal{A}_{\alpha,c,L}/n,$$

Here, m_c is known in closed form.

e_c is the c -th basis vector of $\mathbb{R}^{|\mathcal{C}|}$ and $L, \mathcal{A}_{\alpha,c,L}$, are known constants.

→ First analysis of Balance in sparse random SBM.

In practice: the SBM parameters are unknown.

- ▶ The connection rates $a_{c,d}$ are not given to the algorithm.
- ▶ Matching outcomes are the **only source of information**.
- ▶ The platform must decide **who to match and learn connection probabilities** at the same time.

Decision-making + Statistical learning are coupled.

Bandit View



- ▶ Each class $c \in \mathcal{C}$ behaves like an **arm**.
- ▶ Playing arm c_t at time t reveals a **Bernoulli reward**:
$$\text{reward}_t = \mathbf{1}\{\text{match succeeds}\}$$
- ▶ We must balance:
 - ▶ **Exploration**: try classes to estimate $a_{c,d}$.
 - ▶ **Exploitation**: match with the best-estimated class.

Our goal: match with unknown $p_{c,d} = a_{c,d}/n$.

🔧 Try each classes in C to build estimates of $D_{c,d} = \left(1 - \frac{a_{c,d}}{n}\right)^{nb_c - M_c(t)}$.

Explore then commit (ETC)

For $t \leq T_{\text{explore}}$:

- ▶ try all classes uniformly,
- ▶ collect match outcomes (match/ no match),
- ▶ estimate all $D_{c,d}$.

🔧 Freeze the estimates, and run Balance.

For each class $c \in \mathcal{C}$,

- ▶ $M_c(t)$ is the number of matches made by the Balance up to time t .
- ▶ $\hat{M}_c(t)$ is the number of matches made by ETC – balance up to time t .

Theorem: (Cherifa et al. 2025) (informal)

Let $R(T) = \sum_{c \in \mathcal{C}} M_c(T) - \hat{M}_c(T)$ denote the regret of ETC – balance.

Suppose the exploration phase lasts for $T_{\text{explore}} = T^{\frac{q+3}{4}}$, for some $0 < q < 1$.

Then the regret satisfies:

$$R(T) = \mathcal{O}_q(T^{\frac{q+3}{4}}).$$

Goal: Control the regret

$$\begin{aligned}
 R(T) &= \sum_{c \in \mathcal{C}} (M_c(T) - \hat{M}_c(T)) \\
 &\leq \sum_{c \in \mathcal{C}} \left(\underbrace{|M_c(T) - nm_c(T/n)|}_{\text{DI approximation for Balance}} + \underbrace{|nm_c(T/n) - n\hat{m}_c(T/n)|}_{\text{DI learning error}} - \underbrace{|\hat{M}_c(T) - n\hat{m}_c(t)(T/n)|}_{\text{DI error for the learning algorithm}} \right)
 \end{aligned}$$

If UCB is used:

- ▶ \hat{m}_c is hard to solve.
- ▶ The **bonus term in estimation changes at every round**

$$UCB_{c,d}(t) = \hat{D}_{c,d} + \sqrt{\frac{\alpha \log t}{T_{c,d}}}.$$

- ▶ UCB mixes exploration and exploitation.

With ETC:

- ▶ \hat{m}_c has the same structure as m_c with estimated parameters.
- ▶ **Explore first:** collect unbiased information.
- ▶ Then **freeze estimates** \Rightarrow Balance has **fixed parameters**.

- ▶ More sophisticated refills dynamics.

In our setting:

$$b_{u,t} = b_{u,t-1} - x_{u,t} + r_t$$

Where r_t is a Bernoulli random variable.

Generalization:

- ▶ Poisson Refills : r_t is a realization of Poisson random variables.
 - ▶ State dependant refills, nodes with low budgets get refills.
- ▶ Simple refills dynamics in Geometric random graphs and configuration models.
 - ▶ Stochastic block model with budget refills.
 1. Matching will depend on budgets and on classes affinities.
 2. More coupled system of ODE to analyze.

Thank you 😊🙏

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